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The Effects of Product Line Rivalry: Focusing on the Issue of Fighting Brands
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  • The Effects of Product Line Rivalry: Focusing on the Issue of Fighting Brands
  • The Effects of Product Line Rivalry: Focusing on the Issue of Fighting Brands
저자명
Koh. Dong-Hee
간행물명
마케팅과학연구
권/호정보
2009년|19권 4호|pp.24-31 (8 pages)
발행정보
한국마케팅과학회
파일정보
정기간행물|ENG|
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이 논문은 한국과학기술정보연구원과 논문 연계를 통해 무료로 제공되는 원문입니다.
서지반출

영문초록

公司生?不同功能, ??, ?色的?品. ?品?散的出?有三?不同的原因. ?存在?模??, ????品和?的?品一起生??, ?位成本比??生?要低. 二, 消?者是??的, ???具有不同的品味, 喜好, 或价格?性. 一家公司可?取?分?具有?似特点的不同群?的消?者更多的利?. 例如, ?品?散通?更准?地?足不同消?者的需要??助公司增加利?. ?品?散的第三?原因是基于?略. 生?一定?量的?品, 不?可以阻止通?提供?一些少?市?的?品?入, 也使得公司可以有效地?付低价格?入. 通?生?各??品, 公司可以?少利基, 使?在?入者有?少?入的?因. 此外, 企?可以生?新?品????入, 我??之??斗品牌. 也就是?, ?一??入者??以低廉的价格吸引消?者, 已存在者介?新的低?量的?品, 同?保持?有?品的价格. ?品?散的缺点是同型?配. 一些?了高价位的?品的消?者??向低价位的?品. 此外, ?新?品??手?有的?品的?化程度不高?, 由于激烈的??, ?品?散?降低利?. ?多?究已?在??分析和市???等?域的?品???的影?. ??展示了一???者可以通??整?量?解?市?中的消?者??量的偏好不同的同型?配的??. 他???, 喜?高品?的?品的消?者??得他或?最喜?的?量, 但?有?方面的偏好的消?者??得比他或?所喜?的?量低的?品. 本?究分析了?品的??在一?????市?, ??不同?型的消?者??量偏好的影?. 我假???家公司?在??意?上的不??, 一???商可以同?生?高, 低?量的?品, 而一??入者只能?生低?量的?品. ?品?散的影?是可以通?比?市??果?解?, ?已存在的??商生????品和只生?一??品?. 在??案例中, ?已存在的??商只生?高品?的?品, 由于激烈的??, 在喜?低?量?品的消?群中低?量的?品价格?于下降. 但由于缺乏??, 在喜?高?量?品的消?群中价格?上?. 据了解, ?企?在?行价格???, 理想??是?公司的? 手提高价格?, 此公司也提高价格, ?被???略?充. 由于价格是?略性的?充, 我?有??相反的效果. 事??明, 一?高品?的?品价格上升, 因???力?弱的??作用超?了?略互?的?面影?. ?意味着, 已存在的??商推出了低?量的?品??需要增加高品??品的价格. 然而, 在?入者的低?量?品的价格?化是模糊的. 二, 此案例中, 已存在的??商只生?低品?的?品, 在偏好低?量的消?群中价格往往增加. 但在偏好高?量的消?群中价格往往下降. 低?量?品的价格下降是因??面影?大于正面影?. 而且, ?已存在的??商生????品?, 其低?量?品的价格往往?高, ?管?家的低品?的?品?量一?. 此原因由于?高品??品价格的?面影?, ??商?有?大的?机去降低低品??品的价格. 事?上, ??的?品??利?的影?不?取?于价格?化, ?取?于??和同型?配. 如果在??成本同?品?量的差?相比是适中的?, ?品?散的??影?大于?面影?, ?而增加利?. 此外, 如果成本差?是非常大(小), ??商最好只生?一?低 (高)?量的?品. 而且, 本?究?分析了?公司通??注?斗品牌??定?品特征?, ???品?的影?. 最近, 大?航空和??航空公司建立了廉价航空?路, 分?是Jin?路和釜山?. ???Hansung航空和?州航空. ?外, ?多?上?店也?入市?, 例如?于?先地位的???店Kyobo已?有了自己的?上?店. 通??斗品牌, 在?的低品??品?新成?比起?有差??, 一?具有高品??品的??商通?生?更多的低?量?品可以增加利?.

기타언어초록

Firms produce various products that differ by function, design, color, etc. Product proliferation occurs for three different reasons. When there exist economies of scope, the unit cost for a product is lower when it is produced in conjunction with another product than when it is produced separately. Second, consumers are heterogeneous in the sense that they have different tastes, preferences, or price elasticities. A firm can earn more profit by segmenting consumers into different groups with similar characteristics. For example, product proliferation helps a firm increase profits by satisfying various consumer needs more precisely. The third reason for product proliferation is based on strategy. Producing a number of products can not only deter entry by providing few niches, but can also cause a firm to react efficiently to a low-price entry. By producing various products, a firm can reduce niches so that potential entrants have less incentive to enter. Moreover, a firm can produce new products in response to entry, which is called fighting brands. That is, when an entrant tries to attract consumers with a low price, an incumbent introduces a new lower-quality product while maintaining the price of the existing product. The drawback of product proliferation, however, is cannibalization. Some consumers who would have bought a high-price product switch to a low-price product. Moreover, it is possible that proliferation can decrease profits when a new product is less differentiated from a rival’s than is the existing product because of more severe competition. Many studies have analyzed the effect of product line rivalry in the areas of economics and marketing. They show how a monopolist can solve the problem of cannibalization by adjusting quality in a market where consumers differ in their preferences for quality. They find that a consumer who prefers high-quality products will obtain his or her most preferred quality, but a consumer who has not such preference will obtain less than his or her preferred quality to reduce cannibalization. This study analyzed the effects of product line rivalry in a duopoly market with two types of consumers differentiated by quality preference. I assume that the two firms are asymmetric in the sense that an incumbent can produce both high- and low-quality products, while an entrant can produce only a low-quality product. The effects of product proliferation can be explained by comparing the market outcomes when an incumbent produces both products to those when it produces only one product. Compared to the case in which an incumbent produces only a high-quality product, the price of a low-quality product tends to decrease in a consumer segment that prefers low-quality products because of more severe competition. Prices, however, tend to increase in a segment with high preferences because of less severe competition. It is known that when firms compete over prices, it is optimal for a firm to increase its price when its rival increases its price, which is called a strategic complement. Since prices are strategic complements, we have two opposing effects. It turns out that the price of a high-quality product increases because the positive effect of reduced competition outweighs the negative effect of strategic complements. This implies that an incumbent needs to increase the price of a high-quality product when it is also introducing a low-quality product. However, the change in price of the entrant’s low-quality product is ambiguous. Second, compared to the case in which an incumbent produces only a low-quality product, prices tend to increase in a consumer segment with low preferences but decrease in a segment with high preferences. The prices of low-quality products decrease because the negative effect outweighs the positive effect. Moreover, when an incumbent produces both kinds of product, the price of an incumbent‘s low-quality product is higher, even though the quality of both firms’ ..