- 전력시장에서 발전가능용량의 전략적 입찰에 대한 게임이론적 해석
- ㆍ 저자명
- 이광호
- ㆍ 간행물명
- 전기학회논문지. The transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers. A / A, 전력기술부문
- ㆍ 권/호정보
- 2004년|53권 5호|pp.302-307 (6 pages)
- ㆍ 발행정보
- 대한전기학회
- ㆍ 파일정보
- 정기간행물| PDF텍스트
- ㆍ 주제분야
- 기타
As deregulation of power industry is becoming a reality, there has been an intense interest in the strategic bidding for suppliers to maximize their profits. The profit gained by a supplier is related not only to its energy-price bid curve but also to its submitted operational parameters such as generation capacity, etc. So suppliers are willing to use those strategic parameters that can be manipulated by themselves and are effective to their profit. This paper deals with the competition model with compound strategies: generation capacity and bidding curve. The parameter space is modeled by dividing into the two strategies, so the problem is made up of the four types of sub-game in a two player game. This paper analyzes the global Nash Equilibrium (NE) over the whole divisions by computing the sub-game NEs in some divisions and by deriving the best response curves which have discontinuities in other divisions. The global NE is shown to correspond to the Cournot NE where the quantity variable is realized by a constraints of a generation capacity.