Section 39(5) of Marine Insurance Act 1906 concerns the case where with the privity of the assured, the ship is sent to sea in an unseaworthy state. The underwriters argue that the assured had"blind-eye knowledge" of the particular respect in which the ship was unseaworthy. Blind-eye knowledge requires a conscious reason for blinding the eye. There must be at least a suspicion of a truth about which one do not want to know and which one refuse to investigate. What has caused greater difficulty is the broad provision in s.17 which appears to be unlimited in its scope. The expression "utmost good faith" appears to derive from the idea of uberrimae fidei, words which indeed appear in the sidenote. The concept of uberrima fides does not appear to have derived from civil law and it has been regarded as unnecessary in civilian systems. S.17 raises many questions. But only two of them are critical to the decision of the present appeal-the fraudulent claim question and the litigation question. It is however necessary to discuss them in the context of a consideration of the problematic character of s.17. In the Star Sea Case, for the defendants to succeed in their defence under this part of the case the defendants have to show that claim was made fraudulently. They have failed to obtain a finding of fraud. It is not enough that until part of the way through the trial the owners failed to disclose to the defendants would have wished to see in order to provide them with some, albeit inadequate, evidential support for their alleged defence under s.39(5). The defence under s.17 fails. The Purpose of this work is to analyze the Star Sea Case, and to explore problems of the MIA relating to the judgement of this case.