Bank Run has been considered as one of the problematic issues in the financial market over the world. Bank Run occurs when financial markets are unstable, depositors feel suspicious about their deposits. In order not to lose their deposit, depositors simultaneously try to withdraw their money from a financial depository institution. Then, the depository institution becomes insolvent. In order to prevent Bank Run to be happened, many countries have set insurance systems for deposits by having insurance companies and acts that guarantee depositors' money from any financial crisis. However, the insurance system, which seems essential for the stabilization of financial markets, may cause moral hazard conducted by financial depository institutions because although financial depository institutions go bankrupt because of moral hazard and illegal activities, government guarantees certain amount of deposit based on the depository insurance act. The cases of moral hazard happened during the U.S. Sub-prime Mortgage Crisis of 2008 and the Korean Savings Bank Crisis. Through this article, this author would like to study how to appropriately make the depository insurance system functional by not causing moral hazard. Therefore, this article tries to set a risk-based deposit insurance premium, which should be announced publicly, as a new regulation for Korean savings banking industry and to make Korean financial market safe and sound.