Those who are ready for moral education in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics are those that “heed the reason/argument” (logoi peitharchein). While the masses, living according to passion, should be persuaded only with threats of penalty, reason and teaching (logos kai didachê) cultivates the soul of the well-brought-up person to enjoy and hate proper things. Another characterization of the good people in Aristotle is that they are free (eleutherios). But Aristotle’s notion of freedom in this particular context needs examining. In fact, eleutheriotês (a noun form of eleutherios) is one of the character virtues Aristotle discusses in NE; but obviously the word in Aristotle’s characterization of the good people cannot mean that because eleutheriotês as a character virtue is limited to freedom in the matter of dealing with money, that is, a mean between stinginess and wastefulness. This paper examines how Aristotle’s notion of freedom in his characterization of the good people is closely related with human reason and reasonableness. Even though it is obvious that reason takes the central place in Aristotle’s ethics, the reasonableness (capacity to heed the reason) of the good person, how it is cultivated and how the excellences of the character (not only the excellences of the intellect) are related with it, has not been given sufficient discussion, especially how it is related with freedom.