This paper introduces and examines Dretske's attempt to naturalize phenomenal experiences. According to his so-called representational thesis, the only plausible way to explain phenomenal consciousness in a naturalistic way is to understand its representational character. The most prominent contribution of the representation theory of consciousness may be thought of as suggesting a way to resolve the 'explanatory gap' problem. Representational theory contends that qualia are not the properties which can be attributed to an experience itself (a conscious mental state), but the properties which the experience represents things as having. Then, our burden becomes to explain how it is possible for our brain states to represent the external thing as having phenomenal properties, which is very different from the one to explain how it is possible for our brain states to possess phenomenal properties. On the other hand, Dretske tries to defend a very strong form of externalism, not only for propositional attitudes, but also for phenomenal experiences. Thus, he contends that Fred and Twin Fred (Fred's doppelganger) would have different phenomenal experiences, even when they looked at the same pond. I argue that Dretske succeeds only in establishing the externalism for the description or conceptualization of phenomenal experiences, not for the externalism for phenomenal experiences per se.