In this paper, I raise two questions about value subjectivism and try to answer them. First, does the experience machine case present an effective objection to value subjectivism? I will point out some problems with Nozick’s thought experiment itself. Second, even if Nozick’s own argument contains problems, isn’t it the case that what he tries to show with it is correct? I am not sure about this either. Different individuals can desire and seek for various things in the world such as raising children, environment-protection, drawing pictures, and so on. In other words, people attribute values to things external to them. Is value subjectivism compatible with world-directedness of people’s desires? I argue for an affirmative answer to the question. The goal of the paper is not defend value subjectivism. Rather, its concern lies in showing that value subjectivism is compatible with world-directedness of desires and thus the latter by itself can’t be taken a ground for rejecting the former.