It has been widely assumed by many that the logical problem of evil, proposed by J. Mackie was successfully answered by Alvin Plantinga’s well-known Free Will Defence. This paper tries to re-evaluate this widely held opinion. For this aim, firstly, I will show both parties of this debate assume without arguments two crucial epistemic/metaphysical premises. One is the assumption of divine omniscience concerning notorious “middle knowledge” involving human free acts. The other is the assumption to the effect that perfect divine omni-prescience is compatible with free human acts. I will argue that the first assumption, i.e., Molinian assumtion leads us into a vicious circle in which even God cannot escape. For God’s decision to actualize our existing world logically presuppose the divine perfect middle knowledge and the latter, logically presupposes the fact that God must have already actualized our existing world. And I also show this point should be distinguished from earlier well-known complaints such as, by R. Adams. In the later part of my paper, I will show why and how the second common assumption of both parties leads us to what I call ‘the problem of divine freedom’, why this problem cannot be properly handled by Plantinga’s way. In view of these serious problems, I think, we are justified to re-evaluate the whole scene involving the threats caused by the traditional problem of evil. I will try to why the joint defence by the traditional value-theoretic solution and Free Will Defence without these mistaken assumptions is more plausible and promising.