This paper aims to present the concept of the imaginary as a fundamental category of the Spinozan anthropology. Spinoza has been considered as a rationalist philosopher who was crtitical of the imagination and of the imaginary. But I would argue that, the imaginary being one of the basic concepts of the anthropology and politics of Spinoza, it is necessary to take a more balanced stance toward it if we want to understand its central role in his philosophy. It not only forms the life world proper to human beings which is distinct from nature, but also provides a normative potential for the human actions. This positive aspect of the imaginary is, however, also the condition for the negative aspect of it, for as Spinoza says in the Preface of the Ethics III, although human beings are not the imperium in imperio, the imaginary projection makes them believe themselves to be separated from the nature. And it is the anthropological condition for the teleological conception of the world and the superstitions. The imaginary is, therefore, the originary matrix for the human life, but at the same time it implies a possibility for the passivity and the subjection of the human beings. Spinoza could be called a philosopher of the imagination because of the specific ambivalence of it.