M. Williams argues that the Kantian or the transcendental interpretations of the later Wittgenstein are misguided. I criticize Williams' arguments as follows; (1) At most what her arguments shows is the obvious fact that the later Wittgenstein's philosophy is not Kant's philosophy. (2) The later Wittgenstein doubts that the limit of language is drawn a priori. From this, Williams asserts that the philosophical research for limits is senseless. But the denial of the a priori limit does not imply that there is not any limits. (3) Williams contrasts the "transcendental" with the "immanent". But the opposed sense of the immanent is the transcendent. (4) Williams claims that the later Wittgenstein's philosophical investigations are the empirical investigations or descriptions. But his investigations are the grammatical, conceptual investigations. (5) Williams claims that the presupposition has the epistemic sense exclusively. But the presupposition in the later Wittgenstein has the logical or conceptual sense. (6) The later Wittgenstein's philosophy is better understood in the transcendental context. The later Wittgenstein's philosophy attempts to dissolve the transcendental paradox in the early Wittgenstein. (7) The transcendental argument in the later Wittgenstein has the peculiarity. It means that to accept the given or limits is not the matter of reason, but the matter of the will or the attitude.